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THE IMPACT OF ARTICLE 2 OF THE U.C.C. ON
THE DOCTRINE OF ANTICIPATORY REPUDIATION
E. HUNTER TAYLOR, JR. *
In Anglo-American law, a contract is generally viewed as a
promise or series of promises supported by sufficient consideration to
render the promise or promises legally obligatory. When a contract
is not performed according to its terms it is said to have been breached,
and the law requires the breaching party to answer in damages. In
some circumstances, a promisor under a contract may communicate
to the promisee his intent not to perform his obligation at the time
it will be called for by the contract. Such a communication is termed
"anticipatory repudiation" of the contract. When an anticipatory re-
pudiation occurs, the question is raised whether the promisee has an
immediate claim for breach of the contract. Article 2 of the Uniform
Commercial Code' contains a number of provisions designed to pro-
vide remedies in anticipatory repudiation situations. It is the purpose
of this article (1) to examine the antecedents to the Code rules, (2) to
isolate a number of problems which existed under pre-Code law, and
(3) to assess the impact of the Code in such situations.
I. BACKGROUND—ANTICIPATORY REPUDIATION AT COMMON LAW
At common law, a finding of actual breach prior to the time set
for performance is not logically possible, for it is only at that time
that the obligor can be said to have legally obligated himself to do or
not to do a particular act or set of acts. Thus, if A contracts on January
1 to supply goods to B on the following December 1, and if on March 1,
A makes clear to B his intent not to perform on December 1, there
would be no action for breach of contract. Regardless of his expres-
sions of repudiation, A could not be considered in breach until De-
cember 1, the time at which he was to deliver the goods. Since A did
not expressly promise to limit his freedom of action prior to the con-
tract date for performance and his repudiation does not preclude his
delivery of the goods, B would have to await actual nonperformance
on December 1 before he could seek his remedy for breach.
In 1839, in the case of Phillpotts v. Evans,' Baron Parke clearly
and emphatically rejected the notion that an anticipatory repudiation
might constitute a presently actionable breach of contract:
[F]or all that [defendant] stipulates for is, that he will be
ready and willing to receive the goods, and pay for them, at
* LL B , Tulane University, 1965; Member, Tennessee Bar ; Assistant Professor, Uni-
versity of Georgia School of Law.
1 All references to the Uniform Commercial Code will be to the 1962 Official Text.
2 151 Eng. Rep. 200 (Ex. 1839).
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the time when by the contract he ought to do so. His contract
was not broken by his previous declaration that he would not
accept them; it was a mere nullity, and it was perfectly in
his power to accept them nevertheless; and, vice versa, the
plaintiffs could not sue him bef ore.3
This mechanistic view of a contract, requiring both an expiration
of the contract time and a failure to perform before an action for
breach, was later relaxed somewhat. In the 1853 landmark case of
Hochster v. De la Tour,' plaintiff, a courier, contracted to accompany
defendant to Europe from June 1 to September 1 for a fixed fee. On
May 11, defendant emphatically repudiated. On May 22, plaintiff
brought an action for breach and subsequently acquired work begin-
ning on July 4. The defendant argued that his preperformance repudi-
ation was in legal effect an offer to rescind the repudiated contract, an
offer which presented to the nonrepudiating party two alternatives:
acceptance or rejection. Rejection would necessitate that the non-
repudiating party continue ready, willing and able to perform until
the date specified in the contract for performance in order to put the
repudiating party in default. Any other course of conduct, it was
argued, would amount to an acceptance of the offer to rescind and
would free the repudiator from legal liability on the contract.' Lord
Chief Justice Campbell refused to accept this argument.
But it is surely much more rational, and more for the
benefit of both parties, that, after the renunciation of the
agreement by the defendant, the plaintiff should be at liberty
to consider himself absolved from any future performance
of it, retaining his right to sue for any damage he has suffered
from the breach of it. Thus, instead of remaining idle and
laying out money in preparations which would be useless, he
is at liberty to seek service under another employer, which
would go in mitigation of the damages to which he would
otherwise be entitled for a breach of the contract.°
Logically, this argument leads only to the conclusion that the plaintiff
ought to be excused from performance. The court nevertheless, without
considering the alternatives, allowed plaintiff to recover damages al-
though he had brought his action prior to the time for defendant's
performance.
Although the doctrine that an anticipatory repudiation may
amount to a presently actionable breach seems thus to have sprung
Id. at 202.
4 118 Eng. Rep. 922 (Q.B. 1853).
5 Id. at 92$.
0 Id. at 926.
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up by accident, it has taken strong root in English and American law.
Several objections have, however, been advanced against the doctrine.
The first is conceptual—there cannot be a breach until the promised
performance is not forthcoming. The second is that preperformance
damages exposes the repudiator to an unbargained-f or risk and ex-
tends to the nonrepudiating party an unbargained-for windfall. Finally,
it is said that the doctrine needlessly complicates the formulation of
damages?
The conceptual difficulty can be overcome by recognizing that one
of the primary aims of the law of contracts is protection of the parties'
reasonable expectations, one of which is that the anticipation of per-
formance when due will not be threatened. Because a contract is
essentially a voluntary arrangement, and because a statement by one
party that he will not perform must be taken at face value, it is clear
that in many situations a substantial threat of nonperformance can be
recognized as being the virtual equivalent of ultimate nonperformance
of the contract.
The second objection is that the doctrine exposes the defendant
to unbargained-for risks. It can also be said, however, that the failure
to implement the doctrine would subject the plaintiff to damage for
which he did not bargain and might unreasonably delay his obtaining
of recompense. Actually, the doctrine is based on an implied term in
the contract—that neither party will frustrate the other's bargained-for
expectations. It is simply assumed that the parties would have so
agreed had they thought of it, and we suppose they could lawfully
bargain away the right to sue for an anticipatory breach.
The final objection is that the doctrine complicates the formulation
of damages for breach of contract. It should, however, be noted that
while the doctrine does complicate the task of measuring damages for
breach, it does not make the task more complicated than it is in
several other instances where the law allows recovery for a legally
recognized wrong. For example, the recovery of future profit lost from
the interruption of a going business as a consequence of a breach of
contract can be recovered in an action for breach, if the interruption
was a foreseeable consequence of breach at the time of entry into the
contract. 8 The law also allows recovery of lost future earnings in an
action to recover damages for a disabling tort.° The amount of such
losses is, of course, little more than a well-calculated guess. Both these
instances, however, are distinguishable from the anticipatory repudia-
tion case, for, in the latter, the problem can be avoided simply by
7 See 4 A. Corbin, Contracts 9 961, at 859-64 (1951).
8 See, e.g., Buxbaum v GCITY Cigar Co., 188 Wis. 389, 206 N.W. 59 (1925).
9 See, e.g., Gibraltar Coal Mining Co. v. Miller, 233 Ky. 129, 25 S.W.2d 38 (1930).
See generally C. McCormick, Damages 9 86 (1935).
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requiring that the aggrieved party await the performance date speci-
fied in the contract before bringing his action for breach. In light of
this, the desirability of the doctrine can be reduced to a simple value
judgment: Is the loss of expectation of performance an injury against
which the law should offer protection even though to do so creates
problems in the precise and accurate ascertainment of damages? The
value judgment has apparently been made. The courts have taken the
position that the importance of protecting the expectation interest
outweighs the magnitude of the problem of lack of certainty in the
measurement of damages created by recognition of the doctrine of
anticipatory repudiation."
II. "DEFINITENESS" AND "SUBSTANTIALITY" OF REPUDIATION
An anticipatory breach of contract occurs when a "definite and
unequivocal" repudiation of intent to perform a "substantial" part of
the contract at the due date is made, either expressly or impliedly,
prior to the time for performance and is communicated, either directly
or indirectly, to the party on the other side of the contract." The
application of this rule has resulted in two major problems: (1) that
of determining whether a repudiation is "definite and unequivocal,"
and (2) that of deciding whether the repudiation is sufficiently "sub-
stantial" to amount to a breach.
There is a great deal of precedent on the question of definiteness,
not all of it consistent. It is generally said that merely to express doubt
as to one's ability to perform is too indefinite to amount to an anticipa-
tory repudiation. A statement of prospective inability to pay the
contract price when due and a request for an extension has been held
to be not sufficiently definite.' 2
 So too, a statement by a subcontractor
that he is having difficulty obtaining necessary materials, accompanied
by a request for help in procuring them, has been held to be too
to Only Massachusetts and Nebraska are said not to recognize the doctrine of antic-
ipatory repudiation. See Daniels v. Newton, 114 Mass. 530 (1874); Carstens v. McDon-
ald, 38 Neb. 858, 57 N.W. 757 (1894). There is, however, considerable doubt as to
whether Nebraska continues to refuse recognition to the doctrine. See Hixson Map Co. v.
Nebraska Post Co., 98 N.W. 872 (Neb. 1904); Vold, Repudiation of Contracts, 5 Neb. L.
Bull. 269, 270 (1927).
11 See 4 A. Corbin, Contracts § 973 (1951).
The source of the requirement of communication is the statement of Lord Chief
Justice Campbell:
The intention of the defendant might be proved by showing that he entered in
his diary a memorandum to that effect; and, certainly, no action would lie for
entering such a memorandum. But the question is as to the effect of a com-
munication to the other side, made that he might know that intention and act
upon it.
Hochster v. De la Tour, 118 Eng. Rep. 922, 925 (Q.B. 1853).
12 Salot v. Wershow, 157 Cal. App. 2d 352, 320 P.2d 926 (1958); Miller v.
McConnell, 179 Iowa 377, 157 N.W. 943 (1917).
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indefinite." A landlord's statement, following destruction of the leased
premises, that he has no funds with which to perform his covenant
to erect a new building has also been held not to be an anticipatory
breach," and the same result was reached in a case where a corporate
buyer stated to the seller that the corporate entity was to be dissolved
and that payment could not be made until after the winding up." An
expression of prospective inability to perform has, however, been held
to amount to a definite and unequivocal repudiation. For example, in
DeForest Radio Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Triangle Radio Supply Co.' 6 one
party to a contract informed the other that an injunction obtained by
a third party would prevent performance, and this statement was held
to be an anticipatory breach.
Even an actual statement of intent not to perform may create
difficulty. As a general rule, such a statement is the clearest form of
anticipatory repudiation but this is not so in every case. It has often
been held that so long as the promissor recognizes the contract as
binding he can deny an obligation to perform as demanded by the
other party, without this denial amounting to an anticipatory breach."
Also a demand for performance in accord with an incorrect interpreta-
tion of the contract is not of itself an anticipatory repudiation," unless
the party making the demand makes it clear that he will not perform
if his demand is not met."
Words are not an essential element of anticipatory repudiation,
for the breach may be effected by conduct. For example, where one
who has contracted to sell specific goods sells them to another, this
act may be sufficient, of itself, to amount to an anticipatory repudiation
of the contract?' In fact, as a general proposition, any voluntary act
of the parties which renders performance impossible or apparently
impossible is an anticipatory repudiation. An adjudication of bank-
ruptcy is equivalent to an anticipatory repudiation whether voluntary
or involuntary?' On the other hand the mere insolvency of a party
13 McCloskey & Co. v. Minweld Steel Co., 220 F.2d 101 (3d Cir. 1955).
14 Johnstone v. Milling, I1886] 16 Q.B.D. 460.
15 Wonalancet CO. V. Banfield, 116 Conn. 582, 165 A. 785 (1933).
16 243 N.Y. 283, 153 N.E. 75 (1926).
17 See New York Life Ins. Co. v. Viglas, 297 U.S. 672 (1936) ; Lumbermen's Mut.
Cas. Co. v. Klotz, 251 F.2d 499 (5th Cir. 1958).
18 See Kimel v. Missouri State Life Ins. Co., 71 F.2d 921 (10th Cir. 1934); Milton
v. H.C. Stone Lumber Co., 36 F.2d 583 (D. Ill. 1928), aff'd, 36 F.2d 589 (7th Cir. 1929).
10 See Michigan Yacht & Power Co. v. Busch, 143 F. 929 (6th Cir. 1906) ; Nichols
v. Scranton Steel Co., 137 N.Y. 471, 33 N.E. 561 (1893).
20 Bowden v. Parsons, 103 Eng. Rep. 811 (K.B. 1808). See Synge v. Synge, [1894)
1 Q.B.D. 466. But the fact that title is in a third party and not placed there by the
contracting vendor after entering into the contract to convey, amounts to neither a
repudiation nor a present breach. See Brimmer v. Salisbury, 167 Cal. 522, 140 P. 30
(1914).
21 Central Trust Co. v. Chicago Auditorium Ass'n, 240 U.S. 581 (1916). This rule
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has generally been held not to be an anticipatory repudiation, 22 even
though the condition would seem as a practical matter in most cases
to make performance an apparent impossibility. These few examples
reflect one of the most basic weaknesses in the application of the
doctrine of anticipatory repudiation—uncertainty as to when a state-
ment or act ceases to be "equivocal" and becomes a "definite and
unequivocal" repudiation.
The second area in which the courts have had difficulty is the
determination of when an anticipatory repudiation of part of a contract
is sufficiently substantial to amount to a breach of the entire contract.
There have been few cases on the point, but the basic test can be said
to be essentially the same as the test for determining when a breach of
one installment of an installment contract equals a breach of the
whole.' Repudiation of a part of the contract prior to the due date
for performance is an anticipatory breach of the whole if the part
repudiated, when considered alone" or with other repudiated portions
of the contract," is an "essential part" of the contract.
III. ANTICIPATORY BREACH UNDER THE U.C.C.
Though the Uniform Commercial Code, in sections 2-609, 2-610
and 2-611, sets forth a remedy for anticipatory repudiation, the term
"repudiation" is not specifically defined. Some understanding of the
word as used in the Code can, however, be gleaned from an under-
standing of section 2-609. Section 2-609(1) imposes a duty to provide
"adequate assurance of due performance" if grounds for insecurity
arise and if the assurance is demanded in writing by the party whose
right under the contract is threatened. Failure to provide adequate
assurance "within a reasonable time not exceeding thirty days .
is a repudiation of the contract. The anticipatory breach problem may
also arise in the context of section 2-612, which deals with breaches
was formulated to facilitate the proving of certain unmatured and unliquidated claims
See generally W. MacLachlan, Bankruptcy § 136 (1956).
22 Minneapolis Iron Store Co. v. E.G. Staude Mfg. Co., 153 Minn. 107, 189 N.W.
596 (1922) ; Phenix Nat'l Bank v. Waterbury, 197 N.Y. 161, 90 N.E. 435 (1910);
Pardee v. Kanady, 100 N.Y. 121 (1885).
23 See p. 923 infra.
24 gee, e.g., J.W. Ellison, Son & Co. v. Flat Top Grocery Co., 69 W. Va. 380, 71
SE. 391 (1911); Johnstone v. Milling, [1886] 16 Q.BD. 460 (repudiation of covenant
to rebuild held not to be a repudiation of essential part of lease contract).
25 See, e.g., Parker v. Russell, 133 Mass. 74 (1882) (present breach of installment
contract plus manifested intent not to perform in the future). It should be noted that
Parker v. Russell is not inconsistent with Daniels v. Newton, 114 Mass. 530 (1874),
where the doctrine of anticipatory repudiation was held not to obtain in Massachusetts.
In Parker there was a present breach of part of the contract which, when taken
together with the repudiation, was viewed as a breach of the whole, while in Daniels
there was no present breach of contract.
25 U.C.C. § 2-609(4).
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of installment contracts. This section limits the rights of a buyer who
receives nonconforming goods as part performance of a multiperform-
ance contract. The buyer may reject such an installment only if the
nonconformity "substantially impairs the value"'T of the installment
and cannot be corrected or if the nonconformity lies in the required
documents, but in all other cases he must accept it if the seller gives
adequate assurance of its cure.
It seems only natural to use the section 2-609 definition of "ade-
quate assurances" in the section 2-612 context. Thus, cure would have
to be forthcoming "within a reasonable time not exceeding thirty days"
or there would be an immediately actionable repudiation. Though
section 2-609 is used for the definition, however, it should not be
assumed that a failure to cure would amount to a "repudiation of the
contract" under section 2-609(4); it is merely a breach of the install-
ment. Whether this will amount to a breach of the entire contract can
be determined only under section 2-612(3), which provides:
Whenever non-conformity or. default with respect to one
or more installments substantially impairs the value of
the whole contract there is a breach of the whole. But the
aggrieved party reinstates the contract if he accepts a non-
conforming installment without seasonably notifying of can-
27 The text of the Code does not provide a standard for the determination of
"substantial impairment." Official Comment 4 to § 2-612 declares: "Substantial im-
pairment of the value of an installment can turn not only on the quality of the goods
but also on such factors as time, quantity, assortment, and the like. It must be judged
in terms of the normal or specifically known purposes of the contract." The comment
also suggests that the parties may in their contract define "substantial impairment," even
in very strict terms. The comment does, however, qualify this: "A clause requiring
accurate compliance as a condition to the right to acceptance must, however, have
some basis in reason, must avoid imposing hardship by surprise and is subject to waiver
or to displacement by practical construction."
One important question left open by § 2-612 is whether "substantial impairment"
refers to actual subjective impairment of the value of the contract to the buyer or
whether it is intended in an objective sense. The comment, when it makes reference to
judgment "in terms of normal or specifically known purposes of the contract" suggests
an objective standard supplemented by the actual knowledge of the seller as to the
buyer's purpose.
A further suggestion of an intended objective standard in § 2-612 can be had by
reading § 2-608 and § 2-612 together. Section 2-608 refers specifically to substantial
impairment "to him," referring to the buyer. The failure to use this same wording in
§ 2-612 suggests an intended objective approach.
With regard to this suggested interpretation, it has been said that
the better reasoned cases under the analogous provisions of section 45 of the
Uniform Sales Act emphasized the personal costs of breach in assessing ma-
teriality. It is hoped that the discrepancy in language between 2-612 and
2-608 is not intended to invoke for the installment contract that mythical char-
acter, the good faith objective observer, as the reference for the injury, and,
hence, the right to abandon.
Peters, Remedies for Breach of Contracts Relating to the Sale of Goods Under the
Uniform Commercial Code: A Roadmap for Article Two, 73 Yale L.J. 199, 225 (1963).
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cellation or if he brings an action with respect only to past
installments or demands performance as to future install-
ments.
"Substantial impairment," without explanation whether this refers
simply to actual impairment in value to the buyer or substantial im-
pairment as judged by the ordinary reasonable man, is made the test
of whether it is a breach of one installment or the whole contract. If
the breach substantially impairs the value of the whole contract, it
is both a present breach and an anticipatory repudiation so long as
the contract is not "reinstated" by the aggrieved party.
As noted above, under pre-Code law an insignificant or partial
preperformance repudiation would not operate as an anticipatory
breach. Neither would a statement or act indicating a lack of intent
to perform, if the statement or act were equivocal. Not even insolvency
would amount to anticipatory breach unless accompanied by an ad-
judication of bankruptcy. Under the Code, however, it is possible for
any of these occurrences to become an anticipatory breach of a con-
tract, even though some of them will not directly amount to a breach.
Since the Code nowhere defines repudiation, we might suppose that
general contract principles still govern whether an act is sufficiently
"definite and unequivocal" to amount to a breach. 29
 On the other
hand, the substantiality of the breach seems to be governed by new
principles geared not to the laying down of general rules but to deciding
the individual case. Insolvency though not adjudicated, 29
 prior default
under similar contracts, change in management of a corporate party,
statements of doubt of ability to perform and unwarranted demands
as conditions to performance are examples of the type of occurrence
which can properly be treated as impairing the "other's expectation
of receiving due performance." One ought, however, to be cautious in
demanding assurance of performance, for substantiality is difficult to
gauge.
28 See U.C.C. 1-103. 	 •
20 It should be noted that the Uniform Commercial Code's definition of insolvency
differs' from that of the federal Bankruptcy Act, 11 U.S.C. §§ 1-1103 (1964).
A person shall be deemed insolvent within the provisions of this title whenever
the aggregate of his property, exclusive of any property which he may have
conveyed, transferred, concealed, removed, or permitted to be concealed or
removed, with intent to defraud, hinder, or delay his creditors, shall not at a
fair valuation be sufficient in amount to pay his debts ....
11 U.S.C. § 1(19) (1964). This definition has been criticized because a debtor with
nonmatured long-term assets not easily liquidated at a theoretically fair valuation cannot
generally be forced into bankruptcy until his financial situation has greatly deteriorated.
See W. MacLachlan, Bankruptcy § 15, at 12 (1956). The Uniform Commercial Code
adopts a definition of insolvency virtually the same as the equity definition. It is
defined in 1-201(23): "A person is 'insolvent' who either has ceased to pay his debts
in the ordinary course of business or cannot pay his debts as they become due or is
insolvent within the meaning of federal bankruptcy law."
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But, assuming that one party makes a legitimate claim for as-
surance, how can he determine the "adequacy" of the assurances he
receives in return? Section 2-609 offers little help; subsection (2)
provides: "Between merchants . . . the adequacy of any assurance
offered shall be determined according to commercial standards." The
official comments add little clarification; comment 4 offers the following
illustration of what the drafters intended:
[W]here the buyer can make use of a defective delivery, a
mere promise by a seller of good repute that he is giving the
matter his attention and that the defect will not be repeated,
is normally sufficient. Under the same circumstances, how-
ever, a similar statement by a known corner-cutter might well
be considered insufficient without the posting of a guaranty
or, if so demanded by the buyer, a speedy replacement of
the delivery involved. By the same token where a delivery
has defects, even though easily curable, which interfere with
easy use by the buyer, no verbal assurance can be deemed
adequate which is not accompanied by replacement, repair,
money-allowance, or other commercially reasonable cure.
A partial elimination of this lack of certainty can be achieved by
including in sales contracts a provision requiring one party to make
certain specified assurances of performance on demand and declaring
that a failure to do so is a repudiation of the contract. The certainty of
such a provision will be limited by the section 1-203 requirement:
"Every contract or duty within this Act imposes an obligation of good
faith in its performance or enforcement." Also section 1-208 might
well be extended by analogy to cover such provisions. Section 1 -208,
which covers options to accelerate at will, provides:
A term providing that one party or his successor in
interest may accelerate payment or performance or require
collateral or additional collateral "at will" or "when he deems
himself insecure" or in words of similar import shall be con-
strued to mean that he shall have power to do so only if he
in good faith believes that the prospect of payment or per-
formance is impaired. The burden of establishing lack of
good faith is on the party against whom the power has been
exercised.
The basic advantage of this approach of providing in the contract
for the effectiveness of a demand for adequate assurance of per-
formance "at will" is indicated in this last sentence of section 1-208.
The party of whom the demand is made should have "the burden of
establishing lack of good faith...." On the other hand, in the absence
925
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of such an agreement, section 2-609 alone would apply, and it would
seem that the party making the demand or rejecting an assurance of
performance as inadequate would have the burden of establishing the
justification for his position.
The general common law rule has been that the doctrine of antic-
ipatory breach is not applicable when one party has fully performed.
Thus, unless the nonrepudiating party is obligated under the contract
at the time of the repudiation, the repudiation is not treated as a breach
prior to the time specified in the contract for performance." The
explanation for this is historical. As previously indicated, the primary
concern in Hochster v. De la Tour" was for the nonrepudiating
party—the one who would have had to choose between remaining
ready to perform and being treated as having accepted an offer to
rescind. Because he need not make this choice in the case of a repudi-
ation after he has performed, many courts have not applied the doctrine
to this situation. For example, when goods are sold for credit, a state-
ment by the buyer that he will not pay when payment will become
due does not amount to an effective anticipatory breach."
It is submitted that this historical aberration should be held to
be displaced by the Code. Though no section of the Code expressly
rejects the rule and though section 1-103 provides that "[ujnless dis-
placed by the particular provisions of this Act, the principles of law
and equity . . . shall supplement its provisions," the entire Code must
be read in light of section 1-102(1): "This Act shall be liberally con-
strued and applied to promote its underlying purposes and policies."
Though none of the "underlying purposes and policies" of the
Code specifically stated in section 1-102(2) are particularly applicable,
other "purposes and policies" may be found implicit in the Code's
express provisions, for the effect of subsection (1) is not only to pro-
vide the Code with the force of law, but also to make it a source of
law," One of these "purposes and policies" is the recognition of the
expectation interest of all parties in their contract rights. Since pro-
tection of this interest is the real basis for the doctrine of anticipatory
repudiation, it would seem that the Code demands discontinuance of
30 See, e.g., Operators' Oil Co. v. Barbre, 65 F.2d 857 (10th Cir. 1933) ; Manu-
facturers' Furniture Co. v. Read, 172 Ark. 642, 290 S.W. 353 (1927) ; Sheketoff v.
Prevedine, 133 Conn. 389, 51 A.2d 922 (1947) ; Huffman v. Martin, 226 Ky. 137, 10
S.W.2d 636 (1928) ; Phelps v. Herro, 215 Md. 223, 137 A.2d 159 (1957) ; Leon v.
Barnsdall Zinc Co., 309 Mo. 276, 274 S.W. 699 (1925).
81 118 Eng. Rep. 922 (Q.B. 1853).
02 See, e.g., Phelps v. Herro, 215 Md. 223, 137 A.2d 159 (1957). But note the
different rule in bankruptcy cases See Central Trust Co. v. Chicago Auditorium Ass'n,
240 U.S. 581 (1916) (unilateral unmatured money debt held provable in bankruptcy
on the ground that adjudication of bankruptcy was an anticipatory breach).
33 See Franklin, On the Legal Method of the Uniform Commercial Code, 16 Law
& Contemp. Prob. 330 (1951).
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the artificial distinction between contracts which have been fully per-
formed by one party and those which are completely executory.
Even if the Code is not interpreted as rejecting the traditional
rule, that rule is undermined to a large extent by the express language
of section 2-609(1): "When reasonable grounds for insecurity
arise with respect to the performance of either party the other may
in writing demand adequate assurance of due performance and until
he receives such assurance may if commercially reasonable suspend
any performance for which he has not already received the agreed
return." Section 2-609(4) supplements the above: "After receipt of
a justified demand failure to provide within a reasonable time not
exceeding thirty days such assurance of due performance as is ade-
quate under the circumstances of the particular case is a repudiation
of the contract." From the wording of these provisions it is clear that
repudiation of an obligation, the consideration for which has already
been performed, can occur under section 2-609. Section 2-609(1)
refers to "the performance of either party," not to the particular type
of performance.
At common law, the repudiatee is excused from future perform-,
ance, the repudiation providing him with a defense. 34 This is still
the law under section 2-610(c), which gives the nonrepudiating party
the right to "suspend his own performance" in case of a preperform-
ance repudiation which substantially impairs the value of the contract.
Under general contract law there was, however, a twist: If the non-
repudiating party was not in a position to perform either at the time
of repudiation or at sometime thereafter prior to the date for per-
formance, he had no remedy." The fact that the repudiation may
have been unjustified did not change this result," and the burden of
proving the necessary ability to perform was on the nonrepudiating
plaintiff." Where inability to perform in accordance with the terms
of the contract exists at the time of repudiation but can be corrected
prior to the performance date, this inability does not prevent successful
maintenance of a breach of contract action arising from the anticipa-
tory repudiation."
34 Torkomian v. Russell, 90 Conn. 481, 97 A. 760 (1916).
35 Gerli v. Poidebard Silk Mfg. Co., 57 N.J.L. 432, 31 A. 401 (1895) (the fact
that the seller did not obtain goods in time to deliver in accordance with contract
terms held to preclude recovery for prior anticipatory repudiation of the contract) ;
Strasbourger v. Leerburger, 233 N.Y. 55, 134 N.E. 834 (1922) (nonrepudiating party
denied recovery because of failure to prove ability to pay purchase price as agreed).
36 Bertrand V. Jones, 58 N.J. Super. 273, 156 A.2d 161 (1959).
37 United States Overseas Airlines v. Compania Aerea Viajes Expressos, 246 F.2d
951 (2d Cir. 1957) ; Strasbourger v. Leerburger, 233 N.Y. 55, 134 N.E. 834 (1922).
38 E.g., Scholle v. Cuban-Venezuelan Oil Voting Trust, 285 F.2d 318 (2d Cir. 1960)
(the fact that present financial inability could have been corrected by loan from others
shown ready, willing and able to make such loan held sufficient to allow nonrepudiating
party to sue for anticipatory breach).
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The continued viability of the requirement of ability to perform
as a requisite to the successful maintenance of an action for antici-
patory breach is in doubt under the Uniform Commercial Code. No
section or comment mentions the rule, but this fact alone should not
be viewed as a rejection of the principle. For its rejection would
allow the nonrepudiating party to recover at least some damages, when,
in actuality, he is not damaged. In fact, it can reasonably be said that
the repudiation operates to his benefit, for without it he, being unable
to perform, would have incurred liability for breach of contract. The
principle should be considered to be preserved under section 1-103:
"Unless displaced by the particular provisions of this Act, the prin-
ciples of law and equity . . . shall supplement its provisions." Nor
would "liberal construction" under section 1 - 102 require or even
suggest a contrary conclusion, for there seems to be no underlying
purpose or policy which such a result would serve. The interest in
expectation cannot be said to be preserved by allowing the repudiatee
to sue, for absent the repudiation all he could have realistically ex-
pected was a lawsuit. Further, it can be said that proper interpreta-
tion of section 2-610 itself would demand that the rule continue in
effect. Section 2-610 requires that the repudiation "substantially im-
pair" the value of the contract before the provisions of that section
become operative. It can be argued persuasively that no repudiation
substantially impairs the value of a contract unless the nonrepudiating
party could have satisfied his obligations under the contract, for
without this ability, the contract had no value to him which could
be impaired.
IV. DAMAGES
Under pre-Code law, damages for anticipatory breach were meas-
ured by the difference between the contract price and the market price
at the time and place for performance. If the action were tried before
the performance date, the market price at the time of trial would
prevail." The Code can be said to follow the former but not the latter
rule. Such a statement is, however, oversimplified, and it is necessary
39 In re New York, N.H. & H.R.R., 298 F.2d 761 (2d Cir. 1962); In re Marshall's
Garage, 63 F.2d 759 (2d Cir. 1933). The reason for the rule was that the market price
at the time of trial was the best evidence of the future market price. If, however, the
contract specified no performance date and there was thus no distinction between pre-
and postperformance actions, the market price at the time of repudiation might be
decisive. McJunkin Corp. v. North Carolina Natural Gas Corp., 300 F.2d 794, 803
(4th Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 830 (1962).
Professor Corbin argued that the reduction in the assignability value of the con-
tract which resulted from the repudiation ought to be the measure of damages. 5 A
Corbin, Contracts § 1053 (1964). Some courts agreed. See Chaplin v. Hicks, 119111 2
K.B. 786, 791-93. See also Wachtel v. National Alfalfa Journal Co., 190 Iowa 1293, 176
N.W. 801 (1920); Kansas City, M. & O. Ry. y. Bell, 197 S.W. 322 (Tex. Civ. App. 1917).
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to take a closer look at the Code's provisions to see just what they
require in anticipatory breach cases. In the first place, the Code
remedies depend entirely on whether it is the buyer or the seller who
has repudiated or breached. The sections will be discussed one by
one; first, the remedies of a buyer against a breathing seller, and
then the reverse.
When the buyer sues on account of an anticipatory breach, the
damages equal the difference between "market price at the time when
the buyer learned of the breach," and the price specified in the con-
tract.' The phrase which needs interpretation here is "when the buyer
learned of the breach." In an ordinary breach situation, this phrase
is not hard to apply, for its purpose is quite plain: If a seller breaches
on the date for performance, but the buyer does not learn of the default
for some time,' the later time should be the time for measuring dam-
ages. In the anticipatory breach situation the result becomes somewhat
puzzling. If the time when the buyer "learns of the breach" is inter-
preted to mean the time when he hears a "definite and unequivocal"
repudiation from the seller, then the Code has given the seller power
over the date when market price will be computed, and hence power
to keep the amount of damages low. This is not, however, a necessary
result. If the buyer decides to wait a "commercially reasonable time,"
as section 2-610 allows him to, before determining that the seller has
really breached, one wonders whether he learns of the breach when
the seller repudiates or when he, the buyer, determines that the repudi-
ation is a breach. No matter which line of reasoning is applied, the
same objection obtains: In the former case, a seller can issue his
repudiation when he wants and thus absolutely control damages; in
the latter, the buyer can be "pigheaded" in determining when the
repudiation amounts to a breach and thereby to a great extent control
the amount of damages.
In this situation the Code seems to force the choice of providing
an advantage to one of the two parties, and it seems we must choose
the buyer. The seller will always control the time he issues a repudi-
ation. The buyer, on the other hand, is at least limited in his choice
by the "commercially reasonable time" of section 2-610. If so, repu-
diation is automatically converted into a breach after the expiration
of a commercially reasonable period for awaiting performance, even
though the repudiatee may not treat it as such. For example, on
January 1, A agrees to sell and B to buy specified goods at $10.00 per
unit to be delivered on December 1. The market price at the time the
contract is entered into is $10 per unit. The market price then rises
4° U.C.C. § 2-713(0.
41 He need not be lax. There may be a latent defect which renders the product
unmerchantable.
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to $25 on July 1. Assuming that A repudiates before July 1 and that
July 1 is viewed as the end of a commercially reasonable time for
awaiting performance, the buyer should be treated as having "learned
of" the breach at that time. Thus if B seeks to recover under section
2-713(1) he will be limited to the difference between the contract
price and the market price on July 1.
Neither the text of section 2-610 nor the official comments sug-
gest a criterion to be applied in determining what is a "commercially
reasonable" time to await performance. Perhaps the most reasonable
waiting period in the largest number of cases would be the period up
to and including the date when performance is due. The seller should
have contemplated that his liability in case of breach would be based
upon the market price at the time specified for performance even
though he can never foresee precisely what that price will be. This
approach can be justified on another ground; by exposing the seller
to maximum liability for breach, he is encouraged to perform his
contractual obligations." The buyer should thus have two alternative
courses in case of a preperformance repudiation by the seller. First,
he can, as in any breach situation, "cover," i.e., within a reasonable
time after the breach "purchase . . . or contract to purchase goods
in substitution for those due from the seller,"" and can then recover
the cost of cover and the difference between the cover price and the
contract price. Alternatively, he can, anytime within a reasonable time
after the repudiation, elect to treat the repudiation as a breach and
recover from the seller the difference between the market price at that
time and the contract price." The buyer is free to select arbitrarily
either theory of recovery and, of course, it should be remembered that
in appropriate cases specific performance or replevin might be avail-
able to the buyer."
If an anticipatory breach case comes to trial prior to the date
specified in the contract for performance, section 2-723(1) becomes
42 In cases where the application of such a rule would appear to be too harsh,
application of U.C.C. 2-615 would reverse the result.
43 U.C.C. § 2-712.
44 Naturally, each of these remedies includes a right to incidental damages and
involves a set-off of expenses saved in consequence of the breach. As to the effects of
choosing the market price remedy rather than the cover remedy, see 2-715(2) (a).
45 U.C.C. § 2-716 provides:
(1) Specific performance may be decreed where the goods are unique or
in other proper circumstances.
. . 	 . .
(3) •The buyer has a right of replevin for goods identified to the contract
if after reasonable effort he is unable to effect cover for such goods or the
circumstances reasonably indicate that such effort will be unavailing or if the
goods have been shipped under reservation and satisfaction of the security
interest in them has been made or tendered.
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operative and, though it still leaves the buyer his choice between
cover and ordinary damages, the measure-of-damages rule is some-
what different from the one just discussed. Any damages based on
market price are to be measured "according to the price of such
goods prevailing at the time when the aggrieved party learned of the
repudiation.""
Thus if the buyer brings his action prior to the contract date
of performance and market price, rather than cover price, is used to
fix damages, market price is figured as of the date of repudiation.
If, however, the aggrieved buyer waits until after the contract date
for performance to sue, and market price is used to fix damages,
market price is figured as of the date of the buyer's acceptance of
the repudiation subject to the commercially reasonable limitation.
Though this pair of rules is definitely worthwhile in that together
they produce certainty as to the critical date for determining market
price, the very distinction between preperformance and postperform-
ance actions is open to some objection. For instance, if the market
price fluctuates but is nevertheless fairly predictable, the distinction
may give rise to tactical manipulation in docketing the trial. This
can be passed over as a rare occurrence, but there is another objection:
If it is the buyer's expectation-interest which is being compensated,
then the rule ought to be so structured as to bring the measure of
damages as nearly equal as possible to that which would obtain on
the "expectation-date," i.e., the date specified in the contract for
performance. Instead, the Code utilizes a completely unbargained-for
performance date—the date of repudiation. The Code might have
afforded the same certainty by figuring market price according to the
market price at the time the action is instituted or at the time the
action goes to trial rather than at the time of repudiation. Such a
delay in the determination of market price would generally better
protect the nonrepudiating party's expectation-interest in the contract
since the market price at the later date would generally tend to be
closer to the market price at the date on which the aggrieved party
bargained to receive performance. This objection might be fatal ex-
cept for the fact that the aggrieved buyer, who is being allowed an
opportunity to convert his contract into a direct monetary gain prior
to the contract date, should pay a price for this unbargained-for
opportunity. The price paid for this premature realization is the re-
quirement of determining market price at an earlier date. Thus, it
would seem that the Code rule is quite justifiable. No matter which of
the possible times for determining market price had been chosen, the
same objections would obtain, and the Code rule, though it is not
48 U.C.C. 4 2 -723(1).
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demonstrably better than any other, is also not demonstrably less
desirable.
When it is the buyer who repudiates, the seller's remedies are
analogous to those just discussed. As is the case when the seller
breaches, the measure of damages varies depending upon whether the
action goes to trial before or after the performance date. In post-
performance trials, the aggrieved seller has open to him the counter-
part of the buyer's cover remedy. 47 In addition to this remedy, section
2-708(1) imposes the pre-Code measure of damage: "the difference
between the market price at the time and place for tender and the
unpaid contract price." For unusual situations, section 2-708(2) sup-
plements section 2-708(1), providing: "If the measure of damages
provided in subsection (1) is inadequate to put the seller in as good
a position as performance would have done then the measure of dam-
ages is the profit (including reasonable overhead) which the seller
would have made from full performance of the buyer . . . ." The
aggrieved seller is thus allowed to recover lost profit in cases involving
the sale of fixed price goods or in other cases where the contract price
and the market price are the same, so long as a subsequent sale of
the same goods by the seller cannot be treated as a direct consequence
of the breach. If such a resale of the subject matter of the contract
is a direct consequence of the breach, and if section 2-708(2) recovery
is pursued, due credit must be made for the payments or proceeds of
the resale." For example, A, an automobile dealer, contracts to sell
to B for $3000 an automobile which A purchased at a wholesale price
of $2500. If B repudiates and the case comes to trial after the date
specified in the contract for performance, recovery under section
2-708(1) would consist only of the difference between contract price
($3000) and market price (which would generally be the same as
contract price) plus incidental damages. Incidental damages should
include cost of storage of the car after breach, expenses incurred in
a credit check on the subsequent purchaser and commission paid by
A to his salesman on the second sale," the sum of which we will
assume to be $110. Thus, A would recover only $110.
If, however, A is a volume dealer, then the subsequent resale will
47 § 2-706(1) provides that "the seller may resell the goods concerned or
the undelivered balance thereof .....and that "(w)here the resale is made in good faith
and in a commercially reasonable manner the seller may recover the difference between
the resale price and the contract price together with any incidental damages . . . less
expenses saved in consequence of the buyer's breath."
48 U.C.C. 2-708(2).
48 § 2-710 provides: "Incidental damages to an aggrieved seller include
any commercially reasonable charges, expenses or commissions incurred in stopping
delivery, in the transportation, care and custody of goods after the buyer's breach, in
connection with return or resale of the goods or otherwise resulting from the breach."
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most likely not be considered a direct consequence of B's breach. It
is simply another in A's total volume of sales and would have occurred
whether or not B breached.5° In this situation, A should recover the
contract price ($3000) less cost ($2500) plus incidental damages
($110), which results in a total of $610.
This same dichotomy between the dealer with limited supply and
the "volume dealer" will cause the damages under section 2-708(2)
to be virtually the same as under section 2-708(1). Assuming a resale
at $3000 the seller would be entitled to recover $3000 (contract
price) less $2500 cost plus $110 incidental damages less $500 profit
on the resale, or simply $110.51 Under subsection (1) the same figure
would be arrived at by determining the difference between the contract
price and market price plus incidental expenses. While the result will
usually be the same under either subsection, a seller should be chary
of seeking his remedy under subsection (2) where the subsequent
sale is at a price higher than the price specified in the breached con-
tract, if it is at all possible for the subsequent sale to be viewed as
a consequence of the prior breach. For example, under subsection (2),
if the subsequent sale is at $3100 and the sale is held to be a con-
sequence of B's breach, A would be entitled to $3000 (contract
price) less $2500 (cost) plus $110 (incidental damages) less $600
(profit realized as a result of B's breach), or simply $10. On the
other hand, an action based on subsection (1) would entitle the seller
to $110. There he could recover the difference between market price
($3000) and contract price ($3000) plus incidental damages ($110),
or $110.
Another unusual remedy is the price remedy contained in sec-
tion 2-709:
(1) When the buyer fails to pay the price as it becomes
due the seller may recover, together with any incidental
damages . . . the price
(a) of goods accepted or of conforming goods lost
or damaged within a commercially reasonable
time after risk of their loss has passed to the
buyer; and
50 In the absence of any authority on the question, it is uncertain whether this or
any other illustration will illuminate the distinction between sales that are in consequence
of the buyer's breach and those that are not. It is possible to contend that a subsequent
sale will not be considered a consequence of the buyer's breach only if the resold goods
had not been identified to the contract at the time of the breach, or only if the
contract involved goods which could not be traced directly to any particular resale, e.g.,
white socks sold by a volume maker of white socks.
51 This, of course, assumes that profit is "proceeds of resale" under U.C.C.
§ 2-708(2).
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(b) of goods identified to the contract if the seller
is unable after reasonable effort to resell them
at a reasonable price or the circumstances
reasonably indicate that such effort will be
unavailing.
Thus, if the seller cannot resell for a reasonable price within a reason-
able time after the repudiation, he will be entitled to recover the con-
tract price. The seller must, however, proceed in accordance with
section 2-709 (2) which provides:
Where the seller sues for the price he must hold for
the buyer any goods which have been identified to the con-
tract and are still in his control except that if resale becomes
possible he may resell them at any time prior to the collection
of the judgment. The net proceeds of any such resale must
be credited to the buyer and payment of the judgment entitles
him to any goods not resold.
Where the action comes to trial before the date specified in the
contract for performance, the same remedies discussed above are
available. The only modification is of the determination of the market
price. Section 2-723(1) reaches virtually the same result here as did
section 2-706 in the case of the buyer's breach:
If an action based on anticipatory repudiation comes to
trial before the time for performance with respect to some or
all of the goods, any damages based on market price .. .
shall be determined according to the price of such goods
prevailing at the time when the aggrieved party learned of
the repudiation c2
There is a problem which arises in the case of a buyer's antici-
patory repudiation which does not arise anywhere else—the situation
in which a seller, when he learns of the breach, is still in the process
of making goods specifically for the particular buyer. Section 2-704(2)
is the governing section. It provides:
Where the goods are unfinished an aggrieved seller may
in the exercise of reasonable commercial judgment for the
purposes of avoiding loss and of effective realization either
complete the manufacture and wholly identify the goods to
the contract or cease manufacture, and resell for scrap or
salvage value or proceed in any other reasonable manner.
52 The discussion of this distinction in the context of seller's breach, pp. 929-30 supra,
is applicable here. When the case comes to trial before the time set for performance, the
seller acquires an unbargained-for economic gain, the price for which is adherence to
the arbitrary rule of § 2-723(1).
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Comment 2 contains an explanation of the drafter's intent:
Under this Article the seller is given express power to com-
plete manufacture or procurement of goods for the contract
unless the exercise of reasonable commercial judgment as
to the facts as they appear at the time he learns of the breach
makes it clear that such action will result in a material in-
crease in damages. The burden is on the buyer to show the
commercially unreasonable nature of the seller's action in
completing manufacture."
The aggrieved seller is thus given several options, subject only
to the requirement of section 2-704(2) that the option selected not
be precluded by reasonable commercial judgment. The options given
the seller can be divided into two broad categories: (1) salvage and
(2) completion of manufacturing or processing plus identification of
the goods to the breached contract.
If the aggrieved seller chooses to salvage he generally has a choice
between two measures of damage. First, he may pursue his section
2-706 resale remedy. This is made clear by section 2-704(1) (b) which
declares that "an aggrieved seller . . . may . . . treat as the subject
of resale goods which have demonstrably been intended for the par-
ticular contract even though those goods are unfinished." The seller
either sells or contracts to sell the unfinished goods, then recovers
from the repudiating buyer the difference between the contract price
and the resale price plus incidental damages less expenses saved—
which in this instance would be the cost of completion of manufactur-
ing or processing. In order to recover, the seller must satisfy the
requisites imposed by section 2-706:
(1) "The resale must be reasonably identified as referring to
the broken contract, but it is not necessary that the goods be in
existence or that any or all of them have been identified to the con-
tract before the breach.""
(2) If unfinished goods are salvaged the resale cannot be achieved
through public sale."
53 This would appear to leave operative the rule of damages commonly called
the "avoidable consequences rule." The injured party has an obligation to mitigate
damages. He is viewed as not having been damaged to the extent that his own action
or inaction contributes to his losses. See 5 A. Corbin, Contracts § 1041 (1964). It is not, of
course, required that he incur risks or enter into other contracts to mitigate damages,
except as U.C.C. § 2-715(2) (a) may alter that rule. See 5 A. Corbin, Contracts H 1042-43
(1964).
54 U.C.C. § 2-706(2).
U.C.C. § 2 -706(4)(a) provides: "Where the resale is at public sale . . . only
identified goods can be sold except where there is a recognized market for a public sale
of futures in goods of the kind . ." The provision as to futures contemplates a
Present sale of a good not yet in its final form. Thus completion of the good into its
final form is contemplated by the words "identified goods."
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(3) "Where the resale is at private sale the seller must give the
buyer reasonable notification of his intention to resell!" 66
(4) "[E]very aspect of the sale including the method, manner,
time, place and terms must be commercialy reasonable?s 6'
The second possible measure of damages in salvage is recovery
of the difference between "market price at the time and place for
tender and the unpaid contract price ....” 58
 This measure is of course
altered if the seller's suit goes to trial prior to the performance date.
Section 2-723(1) then becomes operative:
If an action based on anticipatory repudiation comes
to trial before the time for performance with respect to some
or all of the goods, any damages based on market price .. .
shall be determined according to the price of such goods
prevailing at the time when the aggrieved party learned of
the repudiation.
This market price remedy may be most attractive even if the
unfinished goods are sold for salvage. This will be particularly true
where the aggrieved seller is able to obtain a favorable resale con-
tract, particularly one for a price better than the market price. For
example, assume a contract between A and B, in which A agrees to
sell and B to buy stated goods for $100 per unit to be delivered on
April 1. B repudiates after A has invested $35 per unit in cost of
manufacture. The remainder of manufacture would cost $35 per unit.
The market price at the time of repudiation is $75 per unit. The
market price on April 1 is $50 per unit. The unfinished goods are not
completed but instead are sold for salvage at a price of $65 per unit.
If the resale remedy were pursued, this would entitle A to recover
$100 per unit, the contract price, less $65, the resale price, less $35,
the cost of completion saved as a consequence of the breach, leaving
a total of $0. On the other hand, A could use the market-price remedy
to recover $100 per unit less $50, the market price, less $35, the cost
of completion saved as a consequence of the breach, leaving a total
of $15. The seller may resell the goods concerned or the undelivered
balance thereof. That he has unbridled choice in the matter is made
clear by the permissive language of section 2-706(1), which declares:
Where the resale is made in good faith and in a commer-
cially reasonable manner the seller may recover the difference
between the resale price and the contract price together with
any incidental damages . . . less expenses saved in conse-
quence of the buyer's breach. (Emphasis added.)
58 U.C.C. § 2-706(3).
57 U.C.C. § 2 - 706 (2).
U.C.C. § 2-708(1).
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Where the unfinished goods are fixed-price goods, with no differ-
ence between contract price and market price, or where they are
being specially manufactured and thus lack a market, recovery under
2-708(1) would not be adequate. In the first situation, resale might
be satisfactory, but in the second, it would not. Section 2-708(2)
recovery should be allowed in both instances and it would seem to
be the only possible remedy in the second instance. This section pro-
vides that if the measure of damages in 2-708(1) does not result in
the seller being put in as good a position as if buyer had performed
"then the measure of damages is the profit (including reasonable
overhead) which the seller would have made from full performance
by the buyer, together with any incidental damages ... due allowance
for costs reasonably incurred and due credit for payments or proceeds
of resale." Thus, in the example, if the goods being manufactured
or processed were fixed-price goods or specially manufactured goods,
the aggrieved seller could, under section 2-708(2), simply recover
his lost profit, or $30. This recovery should be possible even if the
unfinished goods are subsequently sold as long as that sale is not a
direct consequence of the buyer's breach. If the seller commonly sells
goods of the same type as the unfinished goods, then the subsequent
sale would probably not be considered a direct consequence of the
buyer's breach but simply a sale in the regular course of the seller's
business.
The second alternative provided the aggrieved seller in case of
repudiation prior to completion of manufacture, again subject to the
requirement that it be "in the exercise of reasonable commercial judg-
ment for the purposes of avoiding loss and of effective realization," is
to "complete the manufacture and wholly identify the goods to the
contract . . . ."5° Where this alternative is selected, the aggrieved
seller, upon completion of manufacture, has the same remedies as
are available to any seller for breach of contract when the goods have
been identified." The seller may not arbitrarily exercise his option to
select one of these remedies, for section 2-704(2) requires that he
"exercise . . . reasonable commercial judgment for the purposes of
avoiding loss and of effective realization . . . ." This standard is
explained to some extent in official comment 2 to section 2-704. The
comment makes clear the fact that the drafters intend reasonableness
to be determined according to the facts at the time the aggrieved party
learns of the breach. It is indicated that any course of conduct is
reasonable unless circumstances make it "clear that such action will
result in a material increase in damages," the burden being on the
159 U.C.C.	 2-704(2).
Go 	 §§ 2-703, Comment I, -704, Comment 1, -706, Comment 1, -708, Com-
ment 1, -709, Comment 1.
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buyer to show any unreasonableness. If the buyer is able to establish
the unreasonableness, the seller's recovery is to be based upon an
estimate of the damages which would have been suffered had a reason-
able course of conduct been selected.
In summary, then, under the provisions of section 2-708(1) the
seller could, if his action for breach were brought after the date
specified in the contract for performance, recover monetary damages
based upon the difference between contract price and market price
determined on the basis of the market price at the time and place for
tender. If, on the other hand, the action were to go to trial prior to
the contract date for performance, section 2-723(1) requires that
market price be figured as of the date of repudiation. Where recovery
based upon the market price measure is "inadequate to put the seller
in as good a position as performance would have done," lost profit
can be recovered under section 2-708(2). In addition to the market-
price remedy and the alternative, lost-profit remedy, the seller could
exercise his right to sell under section 2-706, and then recover the
difference between contract price and resale price. Finally, in an appro-
priate case, where the seller is unable after reasonable effort to resell
the finished goods at a reasonable price or where the circumstances
reasonably indicate that an attempt to do so will be unavailing, the
seller is entitled under section 2-709(1) to recover the price of the
goods from the repudiating buyer. Completion of manufacture, fol-
lowed by an action against the repudiating buyer for the price may
well be considered not to be the exercise of "reasonable commercial
judgment" for the purpose of avoiding loss. Completion of manufac-
ture would seem appropriate only when the finished goods are reason-
ably resalable at the time of the decision to complete. If it should
happen that the seller miscalculates future demand on the market,
this is, of course, no indication of the reasonableness of his original
decision.
V. RETRACTION OF REPUDIATION
Sections 2-611(1) and 2-611(3) provide the repudiating party with
a limited right to retract his repudiation and thereby reinstate the
previously repudiated contract. At any time before his next perform-
ance is due he can retract unless the aggrieved party has "cancelled
or materially changed his position or otherwise indicated that he
considers the repudiation final."" Thus, prior to the next performance
due under the contract, the repudiating party may elect to withdraw his
repudiation unless: (1) the nonrepudiating party materially changes
his position in reliance upon the repudiation, which would generally
ar U.C.C. § 2-611(1).
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be either by the institution of legal action against the repudiating
party or by the resale of the subject matter of the contract if the
aggrieved party is the seller or by the purchase of substitute goods
if the aggrieved party is the buyer; (2) the nonrepudiating party
has announced a decision to cancel the contract, which could be a
step leading to an action for restitution; or (3) the nonrepudiating
party has "otherwise indicated that he considers the repudiation
final."' The meaning of the third limitation is not altogether clear.
When the last two are read together the third seems merely an exten-
sion of the second. "Cancellation" seems to presuppose a formal notice
to the repudiating party that the nonrepudiating party is treating the
contract as having ended because of the repudiation: 3' On the other
hand, the words "otherwise indicated that he considers the repudiation
final" seem to contemplate less formal action. For example, a dec-
laration, "I consider the contract to be terminated because of your
repudiation" would be an example of a cancellation, while a state-
ment, "I consider your repudiation final" might not be a cancellation
but would be within the third limitation 8 4 Under pre-Code contract
law, the repudiating party's power to retract could not be defeated
so easily 65 The Code's approach is aimed at giving meaning to the
basic recognition of the expectation-interest inherent in all sales con-
tracts, the recognition that a damage sufficient to preclude reinstate-
ment of the contract flows from the preperformance repudiation of
a contract for the sale of goods. The Code rule extends maximum
protection to the expectation-interest inherent in every executory con-
tract and at the same time through the damage measurement rules it
acts as a deterrent against anticipatory breaches.
In order for a retraction which satisfies the section 2-611(1)
requirements to be effective no formal requisites need be satisfied.
All that is required is that the retraction be unequivocal and that it
be communicated to the nonrepudiating party before any of the three
steps discussed above have been taken. Section 2-611(2) provides
that: "Retraction may be by any method which clearly indicates to
the aggrieved party that the repudiating party intends to perform,
but must include any assurance justifiably demanded under the pro-
visions of this Article (Section 2-609)." Thus, as a practical matter,
62 The first of these limitations is consistent with the rules of general contract law.
The second and third are totally different from the pre-Code law.
63 See U.C.C. 2-106(4).
64 Also it is possible that an aggrieved party may have "otherwise indicated that
he considers the repudiation final" by communicating such a decision to a person other
than the repudiating party or one acting for him. This interpretation of 3 2-611(1) is
supportable because that section does not specify to whom the decision must be "indi-
cated," but even so, so informal a means of precluding retraction is questionable.
es See Restatement of Contracts 5 319 (1932).
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effective retraction of a repudiation may often require something
more than a simple oral withdrawal of it.
VI. CONCLUSION
The Uniform Commercial Code through its treatment of the
doctrine of anticipatory repudiation should contribute greatly to over-
coming some of the basic weaknesses in the application of the doctrine
under general contract law. To begin with, section 2-609 and its
doctrine of adequate assurance of performance should help alleviate
the problems which have existed in determining the existence of suffi-
cient definiteness for a repudiation and the presence of sufficient
completeness for a repudiation. Now, through application of section
2-609, a rather mechanical means of determining what constitutes a
repudiation is offered. On the other hand, the section 2-609 approach
creates a new and virtually unsolvable problem: When is there cause
for insecurity, and when is an assurance of performance adequate?
A second major contribution of Article 2 is its aim toward pro-
tection of the expectation-interest inherent in every contract calling
for future performance. The application of this principle should lead
to the conclusion that the Code provides a remedy for anticipatory
repudiation of contracts which have been wholly performed by the
nonrepudiating party. Even if this result is not directly arrived at, it
will be achieved indirectly, for section 2-609 and its provisions re-
garding adequate assurance of performance apply both to partially
executed and wholly executory contracts. Thus a repudiation of a
unilateral obligation could, if necessary, be turned into an effective
anticipatory breach through an unheeded demand for adequate assur-
ance of performance.
A final contribution made by Article 2 to the application of the
doctrine of anticipatory repudiation is the clarification and simplifica-
tion of measure-of-damage rules in cases which go to trial before the
date specified in the contract for performance. Where recovery based
upon the difference in market price and contract price is sought, the
applicable market price depends upon the time at which the case goes
to trial. If it goes to trial prior to the performance date then the
applicable market price is the price at the time of the repudiation.
The difficulties inherent in proving market price will often be avoided,
for the Code allows the aggrieved buyer to recover the difference in
contract price and "cover" price, and the aggrieved seller to recover
the difference in contract price and resale price.
The Code's treatment of the doctrine is not without weaknesses,
weaknesses which lie primarily in a lack of clarity. One of these is
the failure to state the date for determining market price in ascer-
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taming damages when an action is brought by a buyer after the
contract date for performance. In such cases, section 2-713(1) re-
quires that market price be computed at the time the buyer "learn [s]
of the breach;" it is not clear whether repudiation is synonymous
with breach. Another is lack of explanation of the concept of "sub-
stantial impairment" of the value of an installment or a contract,
which is the guideline for determining when a defective installment
performance can be rejected and when a defective installment amounts
to a breach of the whole contract."
Even though not without weaknesses, the Code's approach to
anticipatory repudiation should be considered a sound one. Recog-
nition and express announcement of the logical basis for the doctrine
will at least result in a greater predictability as to its application by
the courts.
66 See U.C.C. 2-612.
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